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Protectionism and Steel: The Need to Replace
Outworn Perspectives
by Bela Gold*

T

he paper by Professors Dirlam and Mueller seeks to disguise the
mustiness and narrowness of its one-sided adversarial presentation by
implying some relevance to our current national problems of "re-industrialization". Their virtual failure to deal with these urgencies is especially
disappointing because the problems of the domestic steel industry represent only one special case within the larger context of a rapidly developing foreign assault on an expanding array of major domestic industries
with which our trade policies have not yet managed to cope. Nor are we
likely to develop effective trade policies in respect to steel except within
the framework of policies designed to deal with these broader challenges
to the re-vitalization of major U.S. industries.
I. KEY IssuEs RAISED
Their paper centers around three foci. Most of it is devoted to the
traditional pattern of combining an attack on the greedy, slothful, powerful domestic integrated steel industry with some alarming, but highly vulnerable, estimates of the burdens imposed on our economy by the protectionary measures that have been invoked. In additon, their paper offers
an artful evasion of the central issue of the relative efficiency and cost
competitiveness of the major sources of steel imports, by consistently discussing them as a group instead of recognizing the substantial differences
among such exporters. Finally, they offer a thoughtful, though unpersuasive, effort to evaluate alternative trade policies relating to steel imports.
My comments will focus on three issues:
1. What represents a realistic conception of "protection"?
2. What is the relative cost competitiveness of foreign and U.S. steel
producers?
3. What should be done to strengthen the market position of steel and
other major domestic industries relative to imports?
* William E. Umstattd Professor of Industrial Economics and Director of the Research
Program in Industrial Economics, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.
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THE NATURE OF "PROTECTION"

In its conventional meaning, "protection" refers to governmental
measures designed to safeguard domestic industries from the full market
effects of failing to achieve and maintain cost competitiveness. Does this
mean that U.S. measures such as tariffs, voluntary restraints, and trigger
prices represent attempted protections for the domestic steel industry?
Of course it does!
But does this mean that only the United States has been clever
enough or devious enough to introduce such protective schemes? Obviously not, although the singular focus of the Dirlam-Mueller paper on the
reprehensible behavior of this country might lead one to think so. Have
U.S. protective practices been more restrictive or more protective than
those of other countries? No evidence is offered to support such an
implication.
Shouldn't a concern with governmental protections for non-competitive producers have included other forms of protection in addition to
those for which the United States is so roundly condemned?1 Consider
subsidies to the steel industry, for example. In this respect, U.S. offenses
pale into insignificance when compared with foreign practices. The Japanese government participated actively in enabling its steel producers to
acquire massive investments on patently less than commercial terms in
order to build their magnificant new facilities during the 1960's and
1970's. Furthermore, virtually all Western European governments have
provided, and continue to provide, enormous capital allocations and
grants to cover operating losses as well as other forms of aid to their steel
producers - contrary to the implication in the Dirlam-Mueller paper
that such subsidies have been largely devoted to training and relocation
purposes. The Economist (London) has estimated that the British Steel
I The forms of subsidization are numerous and widespread. Some examples taken from
the countervailing duty petitions filed against European Community producers:
- interest-free or below-market interest-rate loans to cover losses;

- interest-free or below-market interest-rate loans to help fund capital investment
projects;
- government guarantees for loans from private lenders;
-

cancellation of loan obligations and conversion of the amounts to equity;

- cash grants to provide additional capital;
- employment subsidies;
-

subsidies to lower the cost of coal to producers;

- subsidies for export financing;
-

loans from the European Investment Bank on terms more favorable than

market;
- research and development subsidies;
- writing off of interest charges;
- rollover of loans made possible only by government action;
- regional subsidies.
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Corporation, for example, has been losing more than $1,000 per minute
for more than a decade; yet it continues to export to the United States as
well as elsewhere.
Such major subsidies and protective efforts are obfuscated in the
Dirlam-Mueller paper within a cloud of ostensibly insoluble difficulties of
definition, measurability and justifiability, unlike the treatment of what
are emphasized as U.S. offenses. GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) itself has condemned subsidies as not consistent with free
trade, although effective methods for dealing with them have yet to be
developed. And in addition to subsidies, a fair analysis should also have
called attention to the variety of other restrictions on steel and other imports imposed formally or informally by a variety of countries including
Canada, Japan and Mexico.
In short, unless one were advocating unilateral free trade policies, a
balanced assessment of U.S. practices would seem to require comparisons
with those of other major steel producers. The absence of such comparisons surely helps to distort the perspectives conveyed by the DirlamMueller paper.
III.

ON THE COST COMPETITIVENESS OF MAJOR FOREIGN STEEL
PRODUCERS

The Dirlam-Mueller paper contains extensive discussion of, and references to, domestic and foreign steel prices but no serious evidence relating to comparative costs and no comprehensive analysis of technological competitiveness is presented. Their focus on prices reminds me of a
Japanese steel official's response to my query on learning that his company was buying some machinery from West Germany. "Can they really
produce such equipment more cheaply than in Japan?" I asked. His reply
was, "I didn't say that they could produce it more cheaply. I said that
they were selling it at a lower price."
Are foreign steel producers more cost effective than U.S. producers?
My field studies of Japan's integrated steel mills have convinced me that
the Japanese have been substantially superior to U.S. plants for more
2
than 10 years and are maintaining or increasing their cost advantages.
However, I have not seen any conclusive evidence that any Western European steel industry is more cost effective than the United States, except
during occasional periods where there were significant changes in foreign
exchange rates; nor do Dirlam and Mueller provide such evidence. 3 InGold, FactorsStimulating Technological Progress in JapaneseIndustries: The Case
of Computerization in Steel, 18 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. (1978). See also Gold, Steel Technologies and Costs in the U.S. and Japan, IRON & STEEL ENGINER, April 1978, at 32.
3 See Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
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deed, my field visits, discussions and evaluations of relevant data in
Western Europe have led me to believe that most of these industries are
significantly less cost effective.4 Of course, there are a few relatively new
plants in West Germany, France, Holland, Italy and Britain which are
technologically quite modern. However, several of these continue to experience problems affecting their production and costs.'
It seems to follow, therefore, that a substantial proportion of the European steel exports to the United States have involved selling below
costs.' Any review of the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars
lost by European steel producers during the past five years is strong support for such a conclusion.7 Further support can be found in a careful
review of the contributions to their steel industries acknowledged in government reports. Moreover, one serious inquiry into charges of selling below costs resulted in a finding in 1980 by the U.S. International Trade
Commission that all of the leading carbon steel exporting countries in
Western Europe were guilty of dumping in U.S. markets." Moreover, additional charges against various other countries are now being considered
by U.S. government agencies. s
Dirlam and Mueller state that "predatory competition should be condemned and penalized in international trade," and I certainly agree with
4 S. EILoN, B. GOLD & J. SoEsAN, APPLIED PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS FOR INDUSTRY (1976).
5 B. GOLD, PRODUCTIVITY, TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MANAGERIAL
STRATEGIES AND GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES (1979, 1982). Incidentally, Dirlam-Mueller's foot-

note 55 citing my publication Steel Technologies and Costs in the United States and Japan, (prepared for the OTA Select panel on the Steel Industry (Dec. 1, 1977), supra note 2,
as support for the following statement misrepresents my position: "Until the late 1970's the
industry made little progress in bringing its technological level and plant efficiency up to the
levels achieved in Japan and Europe."
See Appendix Table 3.
The sheer scale of the subsidization in the current petitions to the Department of
Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission is staggering. One of the petitions
summarizes it thus: "During the past six years, the steel manufacturers in these countries
have received more than $30 billion of state and private funds as a result of governmental
grants, loans, guarantees or other forms of state intervention. Subsidy programs are now
being adopted in these countries that will make available even larger sums within the next
four years." And these subsidies are being provided to companies whose losses to date are
reported as totaling over $20 billion.
a U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, Certain Carbon Steel Producers From Belgium, the
FederalRepublic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,and the United
Kingdom, Pub. No. 1064 (1980) at 1.
Preliminary rulings by the U.S. Department of Commerce on trade actions filed by
domestic producers found the following subsidies: "40.362% for structural and plate steel
and hot rolled carbon steel bars made by British Steel Corporation. Subsidies of 20.097% to
30.029% were found on steel products from France, while a range of 20.602% to 21.773%
was identified on some products from Belgium. For Italy, the subsidy was 18.3%... West
Germany was found to subsidize as much as 3.594%...

col. 2.

".

Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 4,
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that statement. But they do not offer the slightest evidence to disprove
that this has been the nature of most European steel exports to the
United States in recent years. Nor do they criticize the Europeans for
such actions. Instead, they concentrate their attack on the United States
for its inadequate efforts to limit such dumping.
IV. ON

THE ADEQUACY OF SUGGESTED REMEDIAL MEASURES

Why have European governments supported such costly exports? Remedial efforts are likely to prove ineffective if they ignore the motivations
which have led these governments to persist in economically draining
subsidies to their steel industries.
One major reason for the continuation of such aid has been fear of
the political repercussions if sharp reductions occur in steel industry employment. Most political parties in power in Western European countries
during recent years have only had very slim parliamentary majorities. Accordingly, they have been eager to minimize the political threats and economic turmoil likely to result from shutting down steel mills that are no
longer competitive, especially because of the concentrated impact in certain regions. These political considerations are reinforced by the economic argument that it is cheaper to maintain employment in sub-marginal mills, and then sell the output than to eliminate production and bear
the full cost of the resulting unemployment and other social benefits
when there is no offsetting revenue.
The result has been a classic case of exporting unemployment to the
United States. Dirlam and Mueller properly express concern about the
impact on the U.S. economy of the higher steel costs to domestic customers attributable to the voluntary restraint and trigger pricing programs,
although the quoted estimates of up to $1 billion annually in higher costs
may be exaggerated. They also fail to consider the impact on the U.S.
economy of the enormous displacement of domestic steel workers by the
imports which have been admitted. This could easily account for 75,000
of the 167,000 jobs lost by steel workers here between 1965 and 1980. The
income loss suffered by unemployed*steel workers coupled with the decline in local economic activity dependent on the expenditure of such incomes probably surpasses the extra costs borne by steel customers.
What constructive measures do Dirlam and Mueller propose? Their
general principle is to "support a trade policy that, by keeping the market
open to the hard competition afforded by efficient foreign steel producers,
forces the integrated steel suppliers and their employees to seek the highest possible level of operating efficiency and technological performance." I
agree completely!'0
10

For more comprehensive discussions of other critical problems, see: Gold, Manage-
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Unfortunately, Dirlam and Mueller fail to demonstrate that most European steel exports meet the test which they have enunciated in their
attacks upon trade policies. Nor are such laudable principles consistent
with their review of trade policy options. For example, they attack enforcement of the long existing "import injury, anti-dumping and countervailing duty" provisions of the trade act by using weak arguments of imprecise meaning and measurement. This is a common refuge of critics
unable to challenge the basic objectives and principles which underlie
regulations. They seem more favorably disposed toward the application of
Section 2 of the Clayton Act "which would permit foreign suppliers to
meet the realized price of their domestic competitors." One cannot help
noticing that Dirlam and Mueller do not discuss the fact that foreigners
may avoid restrictions by selling below their costs in order to export unemployment to the United States. Thus Dirlam and Mueller ignore their
previous insistence on keeping markets open to "efficient foreign steel
producers." In general, they seem to be more concerned with simplifying
administrative procedures and minimizing legal restrictions on imports
than with preventing the displacement of tens of thousands of American
workers by foreign producers supported and subsidized by their respective governments.
Let me hasten to add that the domestic steel industry suffers from a
variety of other problems as well. Unfair competition, however, from imports is undoubtedly one of the primary problems which must be dealt
with in order to encourage advances in other critical areas.
V.

SOME OBSTACLES TO, AND POTENTIALITIES OF, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
APPROACHES

Before suggesting some elements of a more constructive approach to
improving the competitive position of the steel industry, and other major
industries under growing pressure from imports, it may help to clarify
perspectives by asking why the U.S. government has been relatively unresponsive for many years to the numerous violations of our trade laws by
foreign steel producers. In my opinion, one of the most important reasons
has been its overriding concern with maintaining and strengthening
NATO. Enforcement of U.S. trade laws against unfair competition by European steel exporters would contribute to increasing unemployment in
the steel industry of Western Europe. As a result, governments favoring
NATO and co-operation with U.S. foreign policy would be undermined.
This is obviously an important consideration for the United States to
take into account from the standpoint of the national welfare. It is likely
rial Policies To Strengthen The Competitiveness Of The Steel Industry,
ENGINEER, Jan. 1982, at 39.
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to increase in importance if similar pressures from unfair competition
should substantially affect other industries. Also raised is the question of
whether successive concessions which weaken an increasing number of
domestic industries, and result in injury to U.S. economic growth and stability, are more likely to increase or decrease the United States' influence
in international affairs.
Further, it is important to ask whether Dirlam and Mueller are correct in implying that the domestic integrated steel industry is politically
powerful enough to ensure effective protection of its economic interests
even when these interests do not conform with what the government regards as the nation's best interests. The events of recent years do not
offer much support for such a viewpoint. The industry has been unable to
effectively resist governmental pressures to curb price increases, and has
had to cope with the most unfavorable depreciation allowances granted to
any major steel industry. In addition, the industry must be responsive to
trade union demands and divert a major proportion of its available capital resources to meet one of the highest pollution control standards in the
world. Under these circumstances, the U.S. steel industry has been unable to prevent subsidized steel imports from taking significant portions of
the domestic market. As a result, this reputedly powerful industry has
been averaging one-half of the average profit rate for manufacturing as a
whole."'
This fact suggests that Dirlam and Mueller are using outdated
images. Government policies are helping to drive capital out of the domestic integrated steel industry instead of encouraging its modernization.
Contrary to the logic of static economic theory, resulting decreases in production capability do not necessarily engender the immediate rebuilding
of capacity when it falls short of demand. Instead, the nation will face a
long and costly interim period for allowing this deterioration of the industry since it will take 6-10 years to build new integrated mills. The existing
steel cartel in Europe and the quasi-cartel behavior of Japanese steel
firms in- foreign markets make it highly probable that domestic steel
shortages will ensure sharply increased prices for needed imports. It is
hard to believe that these prospects are favorable to the nation's economic future.
What can be done? This question is particularly important since the
steel industry is one of the basic industries in the United States that faces
" For further discussion see the author's testimony and supporting submission in
"Challenges to Governmental, Managerial and Trade Union Policies Posed by the Declining
Competitiveness of the Domestic Steel Industry", and associated testimony, reprinted in
Hearings on the Steel Industry by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 22, 1982.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1982).
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the increasing invasion of its markets at home as well as abroad. Other
industries currently facing this pressure include tires, autos, machine
tools, semi-conductors, computers and consumer and commerical electronic goods. Moreover, additional industries likely to face increasing foreign competition within the next five years are high-technology industries
such as aircraft, robotics, telecommunications, flexible manufacturing systems and pharmaceuticals." 2
As was noted earlier, trade policy only represents one aspect of the
array of constructive policies and actions necessary to revitalize our major
-industries.13 Within the area of trade policy, however, three primary principles should guide our government's efforts:
1. If predatory pricing is not permitted for domestic companies, it should
also be prohibited for foreign producers;
2. If competition with private firms by domestic government agencies is
considered to be incompatible with the basic values of our economic system, it should also be denied to foreign producers which are owned, controlled or subsidized by their governments, unless appropriate controls
are enforced to prevent their engaging in unfair competition; and
3. If foreign governments restrict imports from the United States, then
equivalent restrictions should be applied reciprocally to their exports to
the United States.
Despite Dirlam and Mueller's concern over the complexities of enforcement, there is no reason to regard such rules as posing greater problems
than many other regulations. In short, the single most important requirement regarding trade policy for steel, as well as other industries, is a fundamental commitment by the U.S. Government to offer its industries effective protection from unfair foreign competition, and to ensure its
industries access to foreign markets on the same terms offered to imports
into the United States from such areas.
A practical example of an alternative trading policy that has achieved
notable benefits during recent years is the Canadian policy and practice
relating to steel imports. Canada encourages the continuing expansion
and modernization of its private steel industry by maintaining relatively
high levels of capacity utilization, which make moderate costs and prices
possible. What is the secret of their success? Although imports are welcomed during periods when demand exceeds domestic production capabilities, imports are actively discouraged during periods when demand
falls short of domestic capacity. This approach merits careful study, not
because it excludes demonstrably cost-effective competitors, but because
it does not have the consequences which theoretical economists would be
B. Gold, U.S. Technological Policy Needs: Some Basic Misconceptions in TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 141 (H. Miller & R. Piekarz 1982).
'3 See supra notes 5 and 10, for a fuller discussion.
1"
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inclined to predict; that is, stagnating technology and productivity that
lead to uncompetitive costs and prices. Therefore, this scheme may offer
some practical guidelines for increasing the competitiveness of the U.S.
steel industry.
In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize that if the United States is
to achieve the urgently needed revitalization of its major industries, constructive trade policies must be effectively integrated with a wide array of
other policies. This necessarily involves contributions from the respective
industry's management and trade union, as well as from the appropriate
sectors of government.
TABLE I
LANDED PRODUCTION COSTS OF SELECTED NATIONS
AT DIFFERENT OPERATING RATES DURING 1981
(Nominal dollars per ton)*
Adjusted

(1981 values at 1979-80 exchange rates)**

Operating at 70 percent
of capacity
Actual Conditions
(Operating Rate)
Operating at 90
Percent of Capacity

USA

Japan

West
Germany

France

Great
Britain

562
553
(77.5)

567
558
(58.0)

652
664
(62.1)

729
724
(74.6)

753
771
(61.3)

534

506

596

678

678

Production costs include freight charges and duties to the port of entry into the United States
** The data has been adjusted to the following foreign exchange rates
(home currency $)
*

1979 - 1980
Japan
W. German3I
France
Gt. Britain

222.96
1.825
4.24
.4515

1981
222
2.29
5.43
.498

SOURCES: Original source of this Table: Letter from J. F. Collins, Ex-

ecutive Vice President of the American Iron and Steel Institute, to Larry Oppenheimer, Natural Resources Division,
Congressional Budget Office, dated March 10, 1982, com-
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menting on the latter's "Briefing Paper on the Steel Industry
(Draft 3/8/82)" reprinted in Hearings on the Steel Industry
by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 22, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1982). (Letter available at the office of The
Case Western Reserve Journal of InternationalLaw.) For
later, only slightly modified estimates, see Peter F. Marcus
and K. M. Kirsis, World Steel Dynamics - The Steel Strategist #5, Feb. 1982 (New York: Paine Webber Mitchel Hutchins, Inc.), at 20-22 and Tables 5 and 6.
TABLE II
COST COMPONENTS FOR THREE NATIONS IN 1981
Disaggregated Cost ($/net ton)*

Adjust ed

Production Csts
Materials
Labor
Financial
Total Prod'n Costs
Transportation
Total Costs

(1981 values at 1979-80 exchange rates)**
*

y

F

West
Germany
$/ton

Japan
$/ton

344-383
179
70

293-251
111-107
104-109

326
184
43

593-632
71-95

508-467
81-110

553
-

664-727

589-577

553

USA
$/ton

*Certain totals do not add.
**SEE EXCHANGE RATE USED at Table 1.
SOURCES: See SOURCES at Table 1. The operating rate is the same as
shown in Table 1.
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TABLE III
CONSOLIDATED RETURN ON SALES
Net Income / Sales (M)
(Major Producers)

Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

U.S.

Luxembourg

U.K.

France

Italy

Beleium

5.3
3.5
-3.3
-3.8
-13.4
-5.1
-0.5
-3.5

2.8
3.2
-10.8
-3.1
-14.1
-9.4
-17.6
-22.6

1.5

1.9
0.9

1.7
1.7
-7.9
-2.6
-13.9
-10.2
-2.5
-9.4

SOURCE: See SOURCES at Table 1.

1.4

-15.9
-10.7
-23.5
-14.0
-10.1
-11.5

-4.0

-5.9
-17.6
-13.4
-8.3
-20.4

